Wagner Without Prigozhin: A New Path or the End?

On August 23, 2023, an Embraer private jet en route from Moscow to St. Petersburg disappeared from radar at 8,500 meters, mere minutes into its flight. The aircraft plunged into a free fall for several seconds and crashed in the Tver region near Moscow, killing all 10 passengers aboard. This incident dominated international headlines, not for the crash itself but because of the identity of one of its passengers: Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group, accompanied by the group’s senior leadership. Most geopolitical experts speculated that this was no accident but an assassination targeting the man who dared to challenge the all-powerful Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

Who was Prigozhin, what is the Wagner Group, and what events led to this outcome?

Yevgeny Prigozhin was born in 1961 in Leningrad, now St. Petersburg. After a difficult childhood and adolescence, Prigozhin was imprisoned in 1981 at the age of 20 for robbery, serving his sentence until 1990. Upon his release, he began selling hot dogs on the streets of his hometown, a business that quickly succeeded and enabled him to expand into other ventures. He opened high-end restaurants, which allowed him to network with Russia’s elite. One of these establishments, the New Island, became a favorite of Vladimir Putin, who would host foreign dignitaries there. Prigozhin and Putin first met in 2000 during a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori.

A few years later, Putin hired Prigozhin’s company to provide catering for the Kremlin. This connection was crucial in securing Prigozhin’s privileged position within Putin’s inner circle, granting him multimillion-dollar government contracts and establishing him as one of Russia’s most influential businessmen. Over time, Prigozhin’s ability to manage large-scale projects and his close ties to political power led him to more sensitive undertakings, including heading a mysterious military enterprise known as the Wagner Group.

The Wagner Group is a Russian private militia founded by Dmitry Utkin. Its origins are shrouded in secrecy, but its first known operations date back to 2014, during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Composed of mercenaries, the group has operated over the past decade in Ukraine, Syria, and several African countries. Its mission is to defend Russian interests in foreign nations embroiled in conflict and need of military assistance. This role effectively aligns the group’s actions with Russia’s geopolitical strategies while providing military support to these nations.

The Wagner Group gained significant international prominence during the Ukraine War. Its forces were extensively deployed to support the Russian army, spearheading offensives along the Ukrainian front. The group’s peak visibility occurred during the Battle of Bakhmut, one of the war’s bloodiest engagements. This battle lasted nine grueling months, culminating in a Russian victory in May 2023 with the city’s complete capture—at an extremely high human and material cost. During this time, Prigozhin became a prominent figure, frequently posting videos on Telegram in which he openly criticized Russian military leadership for failing to supply Wagner with adequate ammunition and resources.

Prigozhin’s criticisms were primarily directed at Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, whom he accused of incompetence and sabotage. While these accusations indirectly challenged Putin’s authority by targeting two of his closest allies, Prigozhin never explicitly confronted the Russian president. Nonetheless, his growing popularity and the mounting tensions with military leadership made him a potential rival to Putin’s leadership—a rare occurrence in Russian politics.

The breaking point came on June 23, 2023, when Prigozhin accused Shoigu and Gerasimov of shelling Wagner’s forces. In response, he announced a military uprising via Telegram and began marching his troops toward Moscow to demand accountability. The following day, Wagner’s forces captured the city of Rostov-on-Don and advanced rapidly toward Moscow, covering over 1,000 kilometers in a single day with minimal resistance from the Russian military. When Wagner’s forces reached 200 kilometers from Moscow, Prigozhin abruptly halted the march, citing the need to avoid bloodshed, after brokering a deal with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. This agreement allowed Prigozhin to go into exile in Belarus while Wagner troops returned to their bases without facing repercussions for the rebellion. Prigozhin left Rostov-on-Don peacefully amidst cheers and applause from the local population.

In the aftermath, Prigozhin stayed out of the spotlight for several weeks before reappearing in Africa in August, posting videos on Telegram. A few days later, during a mysterious return to Russia, he died in the aforementioned plane crash on August 23, 2023. His death has been surrounded by speculation, with Western experts widely believing that Putin ordered the downing of the aircraft as retribution for Wagner’s rebellion.

A Turning Point in Russian Strategy

After Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, Russia’s activities in key geopolitical regions continued but underwent significant restructuring. Africa remains a primary focus of Russia’s global ambitions, with the Wagner Group playing a pivotal role in this strategy. For years, Wagner operated extensively in the Sahel region, exploiting political instability to advance Russian interests.

In countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, the group has progressively replaced Western forces, supporting military governments established after recent coups. While officially presented as mercenaries combating terrorism and stabilizing the region, Wagner’s operations serve a broader political purpose: ensuring the stability of regimes aligned with Moscow and projecting Russian influence in a strategically vital area.

Strategic Interests: Resources and Destabilization

Russia’s interest in these operations extends beyond security concerns. On one hand, it aims to destabilize Western influence by creating crises in key regions. On the other, it seeks access to valuable natural resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds through direct agreements with local governments. In countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner has combined military operations with business activities via subsidiaries like Lobaye Invest, which manages gold mines, controls diamond exports, and engages in sectors such as timber and alcohol.

This integration of military and commercial operations made Wagner a flexible and effective tool for advancing Russian interests while allowing the Kremlin to avoid direct responsibility for its actions. However, following the rebellion led by Prigozhin and his subsequent death in 2023, the Russian government decided to centralize control over the group, marking a drastic shift in its approach to mercenary forces.

Loss of Operational Independence

Currently, the Wagner Group has lost much of its operational autonomy. While it retains some independence in contexts like Mali and the CAR, Russia’s Ministry of Defense has taken more direct control by formalizing its structure. To facilitate this transition, the Kremlin has promoted initiatives like the Redut group, which aims to partially replace Wagner in 

strategic regions. Redut, composed of former officers from Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and special forces, has absorbed some of Wagner’s personnel and operations. However, it lacks the adaptability and informal networks that made Wagner so effective in complex environments, raising questions about the sustainability of Russia’s strategy in Africa.

Resistance in Africa and the Sahel

In Africa, Russia’s Ministry of Defense has introduced the “Africa Corps,” a recruitment and branding strategy intended to replace Wagner in certain areas. However, this transition has been uneven. In countries like Mali and the CAR, local governments have insisted on retaining Wagner due to its perceived effectiveness in combat and security.

In Mali, the situation is particularly complex. While the Russian government attempted to transfer Wagner’s operations to Redut, the Malian government resisted, opting instead to retain Wagner under revised contracts that included greater state oversight. Meanwhile, Wagner has led successful offensives in the country’s north, consolidating its presence. Nonetheless, its military contributions remain controversial, as areas under its control have seen a significant rise in insurgent violence.

In the CAR, Wagner has managed to maintain its key role thanks to the support of President Touadéra, who relies on the group to ensure his regime’s stability. Despite Russian efforts to replace Wagner with state-controlled structures like Redut, the group’s flexibility and adaptability remain irreplaceable.

Challenges and Future Scenarios

The reorganization process has forced Wagner’s fighters to choose between integrating into state structures like Redut or leaving the group entirely. Although Pavel Prigozhin, the late leader’s son, has attempted to guide Wagner into this new phase, his influence has been limited, and efforts to regain autonomy have failed. The Wagner rebellion marked a turning point in Kremlin policy, which now adopts a “zero-tolerance” stance toward any attempts at independence by such actors.

However, this integration has not resolved the inherent challenges in Russia’s strategy. Wagner’s ability to operate in the “gray zone” of international law and combine military and commercial interests made it unique. The formalization of the group under the Ministry of Defense’s control has reduced this flexibility, creating tensions with local governments and within Russia’s structures.

References

Articles

1. BBC News. (2023). “Yevgeny Prigozhin from Putin´s chef to rebel in chief” Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64976080
2. The Russia Program. (2024). “After Prigozhin: Does Wagner group have a future?” Retrieved from: https://therussiaprogram.org/wagners_future
3. The Guardian vía eldiario.es. (2024). “Del Grupo Wagner a ‘Africa Corps’: La transformación de los mercenarios rusos un año después de la muerte de Prigozhin.” Retrieved from: https://www.eldiario.es/internacional/theguardian/grupo-wagner-africa-corps-transformacion-mercenarios-rusos-ano-despues-muerte-prigozhin_1_11467490.html
4. BBC Mundo. (2024). “Como el gobierno ruso ha reformado al grupo mercenario Wagner después de la sospechosa muerte de su comandante.” Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c514zz52gwvo
   

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Images

1. “Collage of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin.” Knightoftheswords281, Wikimedia Commons. License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Prigozhin_and_Utkin.png
   
2. “Russian mercenaries provide security for a convoy with the president of the Central African Republic.” Clément Di Roma/VOA. License: Public Domain. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RussiansecurityBangui.png
   
3. Map created by Bolland, A. & Bolland, I. (2025). “Map showing the presence and involvement of the Wagner Group in Africa.” Generated using MapChart.net.